

Message Text

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ACTION AF-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 NEA-10 ISO-00 IO-13 CIAE-00 DODE-00
PM-05 H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01
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FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1244

INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T NAIROBI 11720

CINCEUR FOR ECJ4/7-SA AND POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PBOR, MASS, US, KE, SO, ET

SUBJ: HORN OF AFRICA: POST AND HENZE'S MEETING WITH KENYA MOD PERMSEC

REF: (A) NAIROBI 11284, (B) STATE 214253

1. SUMMARY: AF/E COUNTRY DIRECTOR POST AND NSC STAFF MEMBER HENZE
DISCUSSED KENYAN PERCEPTION OF HORN OF AFRICA WITH PERMANENT
SECRETARY OF KENYAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE KIEREINI ON SEPTEMBER 8.

KIEREINI EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING OF U.S. OBJECTIVES IN SEEKING
TO REDUCE SOVIET INFLUENCE IN SOMALIA, WHICH IN TURN MIGHT ALLEVIATE
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SOMALI PRESSURE ON KENYA. AT SAME TIME, KIEREINI SAID KENYA WAS HAPPY
THAT U.S. HAD SUSPENDED IMPLEMENTATION OF SOMALIA ARMS DECISION IN
LIGHT OF SOMALI MOVEMENT INTO OGADEN. KIEREINI EXPRESSED STRONG
CONCERN ABOUT SOMALI INTENTIONS TOWARDS KENYA, DISMISSING SOMALI
ASSURANCES TO KENYA AS PROPAGANDA INCOMPATIBLE WITH GSDF RECRUITING
OF SHIFTAS FROM WITHIN KENYA. ALTHOUGH KENYA WILLING TO FIGHT TO DEFE
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OTS TERRITORY, KIEREINI SAID GOK FEARED IT COULD NOT DEFEND AGAINST ALL-OUT ATTACK. KIEREINI VOLUNTEERED THAT KENYA HAD BEEN DISCUSSING POSSIBLE ACQUISITION OF USED A-4 AIRCRAFT FROM ISRAEL, BUT HAD BEEN TOLD BY ISRAELIS THAT U.S. DISAPPROVED. POST AND HENZE SAID NO REQUEST

HAD EVER BEEN PRESENTED BY ISRAEL. KIEREINI DID NOT PRESS THE MATTER, BUT HINTED AT ANOTHER POINT IN CONVERSATION THAT KENYA'S DEFENSE NEEDS WOULD BE TAKEN UP "AT THE RIGHT TIME BY THE RIGHT PEOPLE". HE INDICATED THAT KENYA WOULD HOPE TO HAVE HIGH LEVEL DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S. "NOT TO ASK FOR ANYTHING SPECIFIC" BUT JUST TO EXCHANGE VIEWS, AND HE SAID KENYA WOULD PROBABLY BE REQUESTING SUCH AN OPPORTUNITY FOR HIGH-LEVEL MEETING SOON. END SUMMARY.

2. POS REVIEWED FOR KIEREINI U.S. THINKING BEHIND SOMALIA ARMS DECISION AND SUBSEQUENT DEFERRAL OF IMPLEMENTATION. HE RECALLED THAT WE HAD UNDERSTOOD BEFORE INITIAL DECISION THAT KENYA FAVORED ACTION DESIGNED TO WEAN SOMALIS AWAY FROM SOVIETS, SINCE THIS COULD REDUCE SOMALI THREAT TO KENYA. KIEREINI CONFIRMED THAT THIS HAD BEEN KENYA'S VIEW, ALTHOUGH DISTINCTION BETWEEN DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE WEAPONS DIFFICULT TO DRAW. HE SAID U.S., UK AND FRANCE HAD ALL INFORM

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ED KENYA OF THEIR DECISIONS TO DEFER SUPPLY OF ARMS TO SOMALIA, DECISIONS WITH WHICH KENYA WAS HAPPY. KIEREINI FELT PERHAPS KENYA HAD NOT BEEN SUFFICIENTLY VOCAL ABOUT ITS CONCERNS, AND COULD NOT MATCH SOMALI ASSERTIVENESS (FOR EXAMPLE, IN HAVING THEIR AMBASSADOR RECEIVED AT THE WHITE HOUSE). HE WANTED U.S. TO KNOW THAT SOMALI ASSUR-

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ANCES TO CONSERVATIVE ARABS AND WESTERN COUNTRIES ABOUT THEIR OBTINENT RESPECT FOR KENYA WAS PURE PROPAGANDA--WHILE THEY WERE ADVERTISING THIS LINE, KENYA GOVERNMENT WAS REGULARLY INTERCEPTING SOMALI MESSAGES WHICH DOCUMENTED RECRUITMENT OF 500 ETHNIC SOMALI SHIFTAS FROM KENYA FOR EVENTUAL USE AGAINST KENYA. KENYANS KNEW THAT SONS OF ETHNIC SOMALIS LIVING IN KENYA WERE BEING KILLED IN OGADEN FIGHTING.

3. KIEREINI WENT ON TO EXPRESS CONCERN THAT IF SOMALIS LAUNCHED ALL-OUT OFFENSIVE AGAINST KENYA, KENYA LACKED MILITARY STRENGTH TO REPEL THEM.

KENYA HOPED ETHIOPIA WOULD DESTROY AS MUCH SOMALI EQUIPMENT AS POSSIBLE. KIEREINI THOUGHT SOMALIA WOULD BE READY TO ACT AGAINST KENYA
WITHIN 6 TO 9 MONTHS AFTER FINISHING THEIR CAMPAIGN IN OGADEN. POST RESPONDED THAT U.S. DOUBTED ETHIOPIA WOULD ACCEPT SOMALI CONTROL OF OGADEN, AND SOMALIA WOULD THEREFORE BE PREOCCUPIED WITH ETHIOPIA FOR SOME TIME. KIEREINI SAID THIS WOULD SUIT KENYA FINE, BUT KENYA COULDN'T COUNT ON IT.

4. HENZE ASKED FOR KENYAN ASSESSMENT OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL SITUATION IN ETHIOPIA. KIEREINI SAID ACCESS TO CURRENT LEADERSHIP WAS

POOR, BUT HE HOPED TO HAVE AN IMPROVED UNDERSTANDING OF SITUATION UPO

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RETURN OF KENYAN DELEGATION CURRENTLY HOLDING TALKS WITH ETHIOPIA.
HE SAID KENYA STRONGLY FAVORED ETHIOPIA'S CONTINUED EXISTENCE AS UN-
IFIED STATE, SINCE ITS DISINTEGRATION WOULD SET DANGEROUS PRECEDENT
FOR KENYA AND ALL AFRICA.

5. PURSUING THE LINE OF THOUGHT CONTAINED STATE 214253, HENZE SAID
U.S. WOULD LIKE TO PERSUADE VARIOUS AFRICAN COUNTRIES, INCLUDING
ETHIOPIA, TO REDUCE SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN SECURITY AFFAIRS. SOVIETS
WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROBLEM IN THE HORN BECAUSE THEY HAD SUPPLIED AR-
MS
TO BOTH SIDES AND HAD ACTUALLY WEAKENED ETHIOPIA'S MILITARY CAPABI-
LITY BY EGGING ON MENGISTU TO BREAK MILITARY LINKS WITH U.S. KIEREINI
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AGREED, ASKING WHETHER SOVIETS HAD VEER BEFORE SUPPLIED BOTH SIDES IN
A CONFLICT. HENZE SIAD HE THOUGHT NOT IN AFRICA,
BUT THAT THERE WERE PRECEDENTS IN MIDDLE EAST, SUCH AS IRAQ AND
SYRIA AND THE TWO YEMENS.

6. KIEREINI EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO KENYA
,

WHICH HE FELT WAS PROCEEDING SMOOTHLY. HENZE SAID WE WANTED TO BE
HELPFUL TO KENYA, BOTH MILITARILY AND ECONOMICALLY. KIEREINI RES-
PONDED ELIPTICALLY THAT "ALL THIS WILL BE TAKEN UP BY THE RIGHT
PEOPLE AT THE RIGHT TIME." HENZE SAID PRESIDENT CARTER FELT
STRONGLY ABOUT SUPPORTING KENYA, PRESERVING KENYA'S CONFIDENCE.
KIEREINI RECALLED THAT WHEN KENYA FIRST ASKED U.S. FOR
MILITARY ASSISTANCE, GOK HAD REQUESTED TWO DIFFERENT TYPES
OF AIRCRAFT--F-5 AND A-4. THE U.S. HAD REPLIED THAT
CONGRESS WOULD NOT FAVOR SALE OF AN ATTACK AIRCRAFT.
RECENTLY, AS CONCERN OVER SOMALIA MOUNTED, KENYA HAD
TRIED TO "GO AROUND THE PROBLEM" AND HAD DISCUSSED
POSSIBLE ACQUISITION OF USED A-4'S FROM ISRAEL. HOWEVER,
ISRAEL HAD SIAD U.S. WOULD NOT APPROVE SUCH A TRANSFER.
POST SAID ISRAEL HAD NEVER RAISED THIS WITH US. IN
GENERAL, WE WISHED TO AVOID INTRODUCING NEW SOPHISTICATED
WEAPONS INTO AN AREA AND TO PREVENT AN ARMS SP
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HENZE REITERATED THIS POLICY AND SAID A-4 REQUEST HAD NOT
BEEN RECEIVED BY U.S. GOVERNMENT. KIEREINI RECALLED
THAT HE PERSONALLY HAD RAISED IT IN FEBRUARY 1976, AND THAT
PRESIDENT KENYATTA HAD RAISED IT WITH KISSINGER, BUT EACH
TIME U.S. HAD ADVISED THAT F-5'S BE DIGESTED BEFORE CON-
TEMPLATING ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT. HENZE SAID THIS REMAINED
THE U.S. POSITION. KIEREINI ASKED RHETORICALLY WHETHER
KENYA COULD AFFORD THE TIME TO DIGEST, AND HE WONDERED WHETHER
SOVIETS WOULD MAKE UP SOMALI EQUIPMENT LOSSES. POST AND

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HENZE SAID THE DIDN'T KNOW. KIEREINI ADDED THAT KENYA ALSO HAD TO WORRY ABOUT UGANDA. HE SAID THE F-5'S WOULD BE A BIG HELP, AND THERE WAS NO FURTHER CONVERSATION ABOUT ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT.

7. IN CONCLUSION, HENZE SAID U.S. WANTED TO REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH KENYA, ASSURING KIEREINI THAT KENYANS WOULD BE WELCOME IN WHITE HOUSE. HE ALSO ASSURED KIEREINI THAT KENYA'S INTERESTS WERE KEPT VERY MUCH IN MIND BY U.S. POLICYMAKERS. POST ADDED THAT KENYA OCCUPIES TOP PRIORITY IN OUR POLICY FOR THIS AREA. KIEREINI THANKED POST AND HENZE, REITERATING APPRECIATION FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE. HE SAID PRESIDENT KENYATTA WAS EXTREMELY SATISFIED WITH RELATIONSHIP WITH U.S., CITING EXAMPLE OF DECEMBER 1976 FLY-BY AND MZEE'S RECENT SUDDEN NOTION TO VISIT AN AMERICAN SHIP (WHICH WISER HEADS HAD PREVAILED AGAINST). KIEREINI CLOSED BY SAYING THAT KENYA WANTED TO TALK TO THE U.S. AT A HIGH LEVEL, NOT TO ASK FOR ANYTHING SPECIFIC, BUT TO EXCHANGE VIEWS. HE SAID NO FORMAL REQUEST FOR HIGH LEVEL EXCHANGE HAD YET BEEN MADE, KENYA WOULD PROBABLY BE MAKING ONE.

8. COMMENT: KIEREINI MAY HAVE IN MIND PROPOSED CALL BY FINANCE MINISTER KIBAKI ON VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE IN LATE SEPTEMBER. KIEREINI'S STATEMENT THAT KENYA WOULD NOT BE ASKING FOR ANYTHING SPECIFIC SEEMS TO CONTRADICT HIS BROAD HINT THAT KENYA MAY BE ABOUT TO REQUEST SALE OF A-4 AIRCRAFT FROM U.S.; IT WOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT ENTIRE DISCUSSION OF A-4'S WAS NON-COMMITTAL AND WAS COUCHED IN TERMS THAT CLEARLY FELL SHORT OF SUCH A REQUEST AT THIS TIME.

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